A Paradox for the ''Smooth Ambiguity'' Model of Preference
通过两个埃尔斯伯格式思想实验，指出Klibanoff等人提出的平滑模糊决策模型在公理基础和行为解释上存在困难，尤其质疑其能否真正分离模糊性与对模糊的态度。
Two Ellsberg-style thought experiments are described that reflect on the smooth ambiguity decision model developed by Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). The first experiment poses difficulties for the model's axiomatic foundations and, as a result, also for its interpretation, particularly for the claim that the model achieves a separation between ambiguity and the attitude toward ambiguity. Given the problematic nature of its foundations, the behavioral content of the model and how it differs from multiple priors, for example, are not clear. The second thought experiment casts some light on these questions.