Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games
通过实验检验声誉建立和利他主义两种理论对囚徒困境中合作行为的解释力，发现两者单独均无法完全解释观察到的合作模式。
This paper investigates cooperative play in prisoner's dilemma games by designing an experiment to evaluate the ability of two leading theories of observed cooperation: reputation building and altruism. We analyze both one-shot and finitely repeated games to gauge the importance of these theories. We conclude that neither altruism nor reputation building alone can explain our observations. The reputation model is inconsistent with play in both one-shots and finitely repeated games while the model with altruism is unable to explain observed play in the finitely repeated games.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C92.