Mortgage Default during the U.S. Mortgage Crisis
检验了双重触发假说，发现负资产与失业等生活事件共同作用才能解释美国抵押贷款危机期间违约率的上升，并指出救助借款人比救助贷款人成本更低。
Abstract Which theory can quantitatively explain the rise in mortgage defaults during the U.S. mortgage crisis? This paper finds that the double‐trigger hypothesis, which attributes mortgage default to the joint occurrence of negative equity and a life event such as unemployment, is consistent with the evidence. By contrast, a traditional frictionless default model strongly overpredicts the increase in default rates. This paper provides microfoundations for double‐trigger behavior in a model where unemployment causes liquidity problems for the borrower. This framework implies that mortgage crises may be mitigated at a lower cost by bailing out borrowers instead of lenders.