Inflexible Rules in Incentive Problems
构建了一个无交易成本的简单模型，证明当代理人因事前获得关键生产要素而产生“抵消性激励”时，最优契约会包含僵化规则（即标准条款，仅在例外情况下允许变通），并应用于监管、劳动和法律场景。
In practice, contracts involve "standard terms" or "rules," allowing for variations only under "exceptional" circumstances. We develop a simple model in which optimal contracts display this feature, even in the absence of transactions costs. Rules arise when an agent has "countervailing incentives" to misrepresent private information. These incentives are created by endowing the agent with a critical factor of production ex ante. Applications in regulatory, labor, and legal settings are developed.