Price Cutting and Business Stealing in Imperfect Cartels
针对标准重复博弈理论无法解释卡特尔中故意欺骗行为频繁发生且常不受惩罚的现象，提出一个均衡降价与业务窃取的理论来弥合理论与观察的差距。
Although economists have made substantial progress toward formulating theories of collusion in industrial cartels that account for a variety of fact patterns, important puzzles remain. Standard models of repeated interaction formalize the observation that cartels keep participants in line through the threat of punishment, but they fail to explain two important factual observations: first, apparently deliberate cheating actually occurs; second, it frequently goes unpunished even when it is detected. We propose a theory of equilibrium price cutting and business stealing in cartels to bridge this gap between theory and observation.