人们会玩纳什均衡吗?来自演化博弈论的启示

Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory

Journal of Economic Literature · 1998
被引 281
人大 A-ABS 4

中文导读

演化博弈论回答了经济建模中的两个核心问题:何时可以假设人是理性的,以及何时行为是纳什均衡的一部分(如果是,是哪个均衡)。它表明在某些情境下,行为最终会收敛到纳什均衡,并揭示了不同均衡的相对合理性。

Abstract

Evolutionary game theory provides an answer to two of the central questions in economic modeling: when is it reasonable to assume that people are rational? And, when is it reasonable to assume that behavior is part of a Nash equilibrium (and if it is reasonable, which equilibrium)? The traditional answers are not compelling, and much of evolutionary modeling is motivated by the need for a better answer. Evolutionary game theory suggests that, in a range of settings, agents do (eventually) play a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, evolutionary modeling has shed light on the relative plausibility of different Nash equilibria.

纳什均衡演化博弈论理性假设均衡选择