Delegation and Dynamic Incentives
通过一个委托代理模型，研究了授权如何通过产生额外私人信息，在有限承诺下改善动态激励，规避棘轮效应，并揭示在何种条件下授权是最优的。
Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic incentives under limited commitment. It circumvents ratchet effects and facilitates the revelation of persistent private information through two effects: a play‐hardball effect , which mitigates an efficient agent's ratchet incentive, and a carrot effect which reduces an inefficient agent's take‐the‐money‐and‐run incentive. Although delegation entails a loss of control, it is optimal when uncertainty about operational efficiency is large. Moreover, delegation is more effective with production complementarity. We also consider different modes of commitment to yield insights into optimal organizational boundaries.