The Unintended Consequences of High Expectations and Pressure on New CEOs
研究发现，面临更高期望或压力的新任CEO更可能报告达到分析师预测，但这种表现优势在排除有盈余操纵特征的公司后消失，且压力与操纵行为关联更强。
Abstract We provide empirical tests of a general version of targeting theory that greater scrutiny could lead to executive abuses. Our results show that new CEOs under higher expectations or pressure are more likely to report meeting analyst forecasts; however, this apparent superior performance dissipates after excluding firms having characteristics synonymous with earnings manipulation. We find evidence that new CEOs under greater pressure are considerably more likely to engage in manipulation while the link between expectations and manipulation is much weaker. The results are strongest for new CEOs whose firms report meeting forecasts and do not “walk down” earnings estimates.