Waiting to Persuade
分析了一个序贯谈判模型，其中参与者对自己的议价能力（以提出要约的概率衡量）持乐观态度，但在游戏过程中会学习。研究发现存在一个唯一预定的和解日期，在均衡中参与者总是能在此日期达成协议，但在此之前从未达成。
I analyze a sequential bargaining model in which players are optimistic about their bargaining power (measured as the probability of making offers), but learn as they play the game. I show that there exists a uniquely predetermined settlement date, such that in equilibrium the players always reach an agreement at that date, but never reach one before it. Given any discount rate, if the learning is sufficiently slow, the players agree immediately. I show that, for any speed of learning, the agreement is delayed arbitrarily long, provided that the players are sufficiently patient. Therefore, although excessive optimism alone cannot cause delay, it can cause long delays if the players are expected to learn.