New Evidence on the Market for Directors: Board Membership and Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310
研究董事会拒绝宾夕法尼亚州反收购条款与董事后续工作机会的关系，发现拒绝所有保护条款的董事更可能获得外部董事席位和保留内部席位。
We examine the relation between a board' decision to reject antitakeover provisions of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310 and subsequent labor market opportunities of those same board members. Compared to directors retaining all provisions, directors rejecting all protective provisions of SB1310 are three times as likely to gain additional external directorships and are 30 percent more likely to retain their internal slot on the board of that same Pennsylvania company. For external board seats, the results are driven by nonexecutive directors who are not members of the management team; for internal board seats, the results are driven by executive directors.