High-Tech Competition and Industrial Restructuring in Light of the Single Market
探讨欧洲单一市场计划对高科技产业竞争和产业重组的影响，分析欧洲企业因市场分割历史而处于竞争劣势，并讨论欧盟层面技术政策的必要性与可行性。
The 1992 program for completing the European single market, represents a massive experiment in economic liberalization. To the extent that the 1992 objectives are attained, the European market of over 350 million consumers will constitute the world's largest, with a per capita GNP comparable to that of the United States. Associated effects include larger potential sales for winning firms, as well as much more rigorous import and foreign subsidiary competition within the markets of the member states of the European Community (EC). Such developments could generate substantial distributive effects. In this laissez-faire perspective, and in view of significant industrial restructuring involving firms from both inside and outside the EC, the question can be raised whether there is a role for an industrial policy to promote European high-tech firms, or should we simply accept the general conclusion of Damien Neven and John Vickers (1990 p. 33), who found little to disturb the tentative conclusion, that in the area of industrial adjustment, competitive market forces do an imperfect job, but one that the instruments of industrial policy are unlikely to improve upon. This paper focuses on, the crucial link between the relative technological competitiveness of European industries and the consequences of post-1992 industrial restructuring. More precisely, we will contend that: 1) firms of European origin are handicapped by their present competitive position, which is inherited from an era of highly segmented markets and national champions; 2) this disadvantage may have farreaching consequences for the economic welfare of the EC; 3) a technology policy at the EC level could potentially alleviate this handicap; 4) the European Commission's existing RD and therefore, 5) the role of the Commission in promoting an optimal European technological policy should not be limited by the subsidiarity principle, which suggests that responsibility for decision-making should be delegated to lower government levels whenever feasible.