Avoidable Cost: Ride a Double Auction Roller Coaster
发现，当存在大量可避免成本时，双向拍卖交易制度在人类实验中的效率和稳定性会显著下降，但人类效率仍远高于零智能机器人。
The double auction trading institution has been highly efficient across diverse marginal-cost market structures, whether human subjects or 'zero-intelligence' robots populated those markets. Accordingly, many researchers suspect that double auction performance transcends market structure and agent strategy. But the authors show that large avoidable costs undermine the efficiency and stability of human subject double auctions and these low human efficiencies are simultaneously well above zero-intelligence efficiencies. Their results dramatically illustrate the potential havoc wrought by highly competitive institutions when they must cope with nonconvex technologies. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.