Power Inside The Firm and The Market: A General Equilibrium Approach
研究市场竞争如何影响企业内部权力分配，发现中等竞争程度下CEO会向下级授权，导致员工赋权和扁平化组织，并预测国际竞争加剧会引发并购或外包浪潮。
Recent years have witnessed an enormous amount of reorganization of the corporate sector in the US and in Europe. This paper examines the role of market competition for this trend in corporate reorganization. We find that at intermediate levels of competition the CEO of the corporation decides to have less power inside the firm and to delegate control to lower levels of the firms’ hierarchy. Thus, workers empowerment and the move to flatter firm organizations emerge as an equilibrium when competition is not too tough and not too weak. The model predicts merger waves or waves of outsourcing when countries become more integrated into the world economy as the corporate sector reorganizes in response to an increase in international competition.