The Ability of Unions to Adapt to Innovative Workplace Arrangements
探讨了利润分享、劳资合作及团队生产等创新工作安排对工会和集体谈判的挑战，分析工会如何调整以适应这些变化，并权衡其潜在收益与成本。
The 1980s have witnessed considerable experimentation in compensation practices, worker participation, labor-management cooperation, and the organization of production. Collectively, such practices at the local or plant level have become known as One concern that has been raised repeatedly both within the academic community and within the labor movement, is how, and in fact whether, such innovations can coexist with unions and collective bargaining as currently constituted (see for example, Charles Heckscher, 1988; Thomas Kochan, Harry Katz, and Robert McKersie, 1986). Profit sharing, gainsharing, and other compensation changes pose certain issues for unions-how to define profits or gains to protect workers and minimize management finagling, for instance-but these probably require mainly increased access to financial information and the technical sophistication to deal with that information. Labor-management cooperation programs that involve union leaders or activists in joint problem solving with management could create the perception that the union is cozying up with management and is unwilling to push worker demands or grievances. But as with profit sharing and gainsharing, the union sector has long experience with cooperation committees and can presumably make the necessary political adaptations. Innovations that establish a second channel of communication between workers and managers are more problematic according to some observers insofar as they possibly could lead to less worker interest in unionism. Some could preempt the union's expansion into new areas of collective bargaining or might threaten to supplant bargaining over traditional issues. And they might exacerbate existing divisions within the workforce or the union (Donald Wells, 1987). Further issues arise with the more extensive innovations like production that combine the radical reduction of separate production classifications, team decision making in work or overtime assignments, and pay by knowledge. Experience in some auto plants indicates teams can lead to fundamental changes in the operation of the grievance system and the union's day to day role in the plant (Katz, 1985). Indeed it has been argued that team production systems require a modification of the system of job unionism- management manages and the union grieves (Kochan et al., p. 161)-which has predominated in the United States since World War II. The concerns discussed above do not mean that these programs offer no benefits to workers and unions. Benefits such as increased security, enhanced satisfaction, reduced alienation, and greater control over the work environment may result from many of these programs. In fact, it is the differential weighting of these potential benefits and costs that has in part led to the variety of union responses to workplace innovations.