Antitrust economic analysis in food marketing channels: a global perspective
探讨全球反垄断执法在食品营销渠道中的趋同现象，比较不同国家的执法机制与实证分析作用，并分析私人诉讼（尤其是集体诉讼）如何弥补公共执法资源不足。
Abstract Antitrust enforcement concerning monopolies, mergers, and cartels is converging across all market‐oriented economies in the world. This convergence is based upon neoclassical economic analysis of industrial organization. The role of empirical economic analysis, however, has not converged as rapidly as the conceptual model because different countries have different enforcement institutions and strategies. This article explains how antitrust enforcement has evolved over time from public agencies to a market for enforcement that admits private parties. Private party law suits, and especially class action law suits on behalf of groups such as farmers and consumers, is a mechanism for redressing the often superior legal and economic resources that defendant corporations have and public agencies do not have. Enforcement and the role of empirical analysis are compared in the United States and other countries. Examples of enforcement from different countries illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches. Finally, some insights explain how economists function in enforcement and the attributes required for success.