Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium
构建模型分析大股东利用监督技术影响证券预期收益，在风险厌恶投资者交易中，风险分担可克服搭便车问题实现监督均衡，并探讨帕累托效率条件及风险分担扭曲。
The authors develop a model in which a large investor has access to a costly monitoring technology affecting securities' expected payoffs. Allocations of shares are determined through trading among risk-averse investors. Despite the free-rider problem associated with monitoring, risk-sharing considerations lead to equilibria in which monitoring takes place. Under certain conditions, the equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient and all agents hold the market portfolio of risky assets independent of the specific monitoring technology. Otherwise, distortions in risk sharing may occur and monitoring activities that reduce the expected payoff on the market portfolio may be undertaken. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.