Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: A Theory of Endogenous Sequencing in Confidential Negotiations
分析了一个买方可以秘密选择与多个卖方谈判顺序的博弈模型，发现当商品高度互补时，买方通过随机化顺序能获得更高收益，且最优不确定性程度与卖方总议价能力负相关。
We analyse a bargaining game in which one party, called the buyer, has the option of choosing the sequence of negotiations with other participants, called sellers. When the sequencing of negotiations is confidential and the sellers' goods are highly complementary, efficient, non-dissipative equilibria exist in which the buyer randomizes over negotiation sequences. In these equilibria, the buyer can obtain higher pay-offs than in pure strategy equilibria or in public negotiations. The degree of sequencing uncertainty that maximizes buyer pay-offs is inversely related to the aggregate bargaining power of the sellers. Copyright 2004, Wiley-Blackwell.