TESTING THE THEORY OF MULTITASKING: EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL FIELD EXPERIMENT IN CHINESE FACTORIES
通过在中国工厂开展自然实地实验，研究绩效工资对工人产量（数量）和质量的影响，发现固定工资制下工人更倾向于牺牲质量换取数量，而计件工资制下这种权衡不明显。
Abstract Using a natural field experiment, we quantify the impact of one‐dimensional performance‐based incentives on incentivized (quantity) and nonincentivized (quality) dimensions of output for factory workers with a flat‐rate or a piece‐rate base salary. In particular, we observe output quality by hiring quality inspectors unbeknownst to the workers. We find that workers trade off quality for quantity, but the effect is statistically significant only for workers under a flat‐rate base salary. This variation in treatment effects is consistent with a simple theoretical model that predicts that when agents are already incented at the margin, the quantity–quality trade‐off resulting from performance pay is less prominent.