Monitoring Job Offer Decisions, Punishments, Exit to Work, and Job Quality
研究了瑞典失业保险中对失业者的监控和制裁如何影响后续工作质量，发现制裁后工资更低、更易从事兼职和低职位工作，造成人力资本损失。
Abstract Unemployment insurance systems include the monitoring of unemployed workers and punitive sanctions if job search requirements are violated. We analyze the causal effect of sanctions on the ensuing job quality, notably on wages and occupational level. We use Swedish data and estimate duration models dealing with selection on unobservables. We also develop a theoretical job search model that monitors job offer rejection versus job search effort. The empirical results show that, after a sanction, the wage rate is lower and individuals move more often to a part‐time job and a lower occupational level, incurring human capital losses.