Threat of Dismissal: Incentive or Sorting?
构建动态激励模型，利用美国大公司人事数据，通过分析解雇概率随任职时间的变化，区分解雇是源于激励还是筛选，发现显著证据支持激励解释。
Many people are fired from their jobs for poor performance. However, it is difficult to distinguish whether they are fired because they are not well suited for their job (sorting explanation) or because the firms are trying to provide incentives for effort (incentive explanation). This article develops a dynamic incentive model of dismissal and proposes a methodology to distinguish between these two explanations. The methodology is based on learning-by-doing and changes in the slope of dismissal probability with respect to tenure. Using personnel data from a large U.S. company, this study finds significant evidence for the incentive explanation.