Strategic buyers and exclusionary contracts
研究买家、在位企业与潜在进入者之间的排他性合同均衡，发现这类合同通常能阻止低效进入，但在多个无组织买家时可能阻碍高效进入，而禁止价格歧视的政策可恢复效率。
This paper characterizes equilibrium exclusionary contracts between buyers, an incumbent firm, and a potential entrant when buyers can either vertically integrate or contract with the outside entrant. In this setting, exclusionary contracts are generally shown to be efficient and to deter inefficient entry that would otherwise occur. With multiple unorganized buyers, equilibrium contracts are shown to take a 'divide-and-conquer' form and, in some cases, to deter some efficient entry. In such cases, efficient contracting can be restored by a policy that prohibits price discrimination and gives agents free reign to sign exclusionary agreements. Copyright 1994 by American Economic Association.