Inflation Band Targeting and Optimal Inflation Contracts
从理论上分析通胀目标区间如何解决货币政策制定者因短期就业目标而引发的动态不一致问题，并说明区间应如何设定及应对经济冲击。
In this paper we provide a theoretical treatment of how inflation target ranges cope with the time‐inconsistency problem arising from incentives for the monetary policymaker to exploit the short‐run trade‐off between employment and inflation to pursue short‐run employment objectives, as in a Barro‐Gordon (1983) model. Inflation band targets are able to achieve many of the benefits that arise under practically less attractive solutions such as the conservative central banker and optimal inflation contracts. Our theoretical model also shows how an inflation targeting range should be set and how it should respond to changes in the nature of shocks to the economy.