Low-Interest Loans and the Markets for Limited Entry Permits in the Alaska Salmon Fisheries
研究了阿拉斯加州为购买有限准入许可证提供低息贷款时，该补贴如何影响许可证的市场价格，发现补贴会推高价格，使现有持有者受益。
This paper analyzes the effects on the market price of an asset when subsidized loan money is made available for its purchase. Under specific consideration is a State of Alaska program to provide loans at below-market rates of interest for up to 90% of the appraised price for the purchase of a limited entry permit. These permits are state-granted, privately owned assets which convey the privilege to fish commercially for salmon. This particular program is conducive to analysis because the number of permits is determined by a state regulatory commission and has remained nearly constant for most salmon fisheries over recent years. This eliminates the need to consider a changing supply elasticity over time. Also, data on permit prices and gross fishing revenues are available. The hypothesis advanced and tested is an extension of supply and demand analysis: that loan subsidies increase the demand for the affected asset by an amount equal to the present value of the subsidy. The price of the affected asset will increase by an amount that is positively related to this demanded shift and inversely related to the elasticity of the supplyflow curve. To the extent that supply-flow is price inelastic, current owners of the asset are beneficiaries of loan subsidy programs. This paper has four parts. Part I describes the limited entry program in the Alaska salmon fisheries and the accompanying permit loan program. Part II employs supply and demand tools to predict the effects of the loan subsidy program on the market price and quantity. Included is an algebraic derivation of a loan's subsidy's anticipated effect on the