Dynamic Bargaining with Transaction Costs
研究买卖双方在交易成本和贴现双重因素下的讨价还价博弈，分析何时立即成交、延迟成交或终止谈判，对理解现实谈判策略有参考价值。
A buyer and seller alternate making offers until an offer is accepted or someone terminates negotiations. The seller's valuation is common knowledge, but the buyer's valuation is known only by the buyer. Impatience to reach an agreement comes from two sources: the traders discount future payoffs and there are transaction costs of bargaining. Equilibrium behavior involves either immediate trade, delayed trade, or immediate termination, depending on the size of the gains from trade and the relative bargaining costs. This contrasts with the pure discounting model where termination never occurs, and the pure transaction cost model where delayed trade never occurs.