Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
研究一个三人立法谈判博弈，议员私下知晓意识形态强度，通过事前沟通和多数投票决定结果。发现并非所有议员都能有效沟通，且多数规则下信息传递可能少于一票否决制，使提议者处境更差。
We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. We show that it is not possible for all legislators to communicate informatively. In particular, the legislator who is ideologically more distant from the proposer cannot communicate informatively, but the closer legislator may communicate whether he would ``compromise" or ``fight" on ideology. Surprisingly, the proposer may be worse off when bargaining with two legislators (under majority rule) than with one (who has veto power), because competition between the legislators may result in less information conveyed in equilibrium. Despite separable preferences, the proposer is always better off making proposals for the two dimensions together.