The Joint Effects of Corporate Governance and Regulation on the Disclosure of Manager‐Adjusted Non‐GAAP Earnings in the US
研究了美国证券交易委员会监管与公司治理如何共同影响经理调整的非GAAP盈利披露，发现监管前治理弱的公司会误导投资者，监管后则不再误导。
Abstract: This paper examines the joint effects of corporate governance and regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission on the disclosure of manager‐adjusted non‐GAAP (or pro forma) earnings numbers in the United States. We provide evidence that prior to Regulation G investors were misled by disclosures of non‐GAAP earnings, but only for disclosures made by firms with weaker corporate governance. After the SEC intervention there is no evidence that investors were still being misled. Furthermore, the effect of the intervention applied to both adjustments that are ex ante recurring as well as to adjustments that just meet or beat analysts’ forecasts.