Inflation targeting under commitment and discretion
用估算的新凯恩斯商业周期模型模拟了美联储若在沃尔克上任时采用灵活通胀目标制，在承诺和相机抉择两种情形下历史可能如何不同，发现过去25年某些时期通胀目标制会带来显著不同的结果。
Inflation targeting has been adopted by many central banks, but not by the U.S. Federal Reserve. Using an estimated New Keynesian business cycle model, I perform counterfactual simulations to consider how history might have unfolded if the Federal Reserve had adopted a form of flexible inflation targeting in the year Paul Volcker was appointed chairman. The first simulation assumes that the Federal Reserve could have tied its hands and committed once and for all; the second assumes that the Federal Reserve would have set policy with discretion. While the broad contours of historical outcomes remain under inflation targeting, there are times over the past 25 years when inflation targeting would have led to materially different outcomes.