Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade
构建了一个衡量商品中间投入中需要关系专用性投资比例的指标，结合贸易数据和司法质量数据，发现契约执行能力强的国家更专业化生产需要关系专用性投资多的商品，且契约执行对贸易模式的解释力超过物质资本和熟练劳动力之和。
Is a country's ability to enforce contracts an important determinant of comparative advantage? To answer this question, I construct a variable that measures, for each good, the proportion of its intermediate inputs that require relationship-specific investments. Combining this measure with data on trade flows and judicial quality, I find that countries with good contract enforcement specialize in the production of goods for which relationship-specific investments are most important. According to my estimates contract enforcement explains more of the pattern of trade than physical capital and skilled labor combined.