Economic and Political Foundations of Tax Structure
通过一个政府最大化预期支持、反对税收取决于全额收入损失的模型，推导出税制的基本要素，并将支出水平内生化，整合管理成本与政治经济因素，展示税制是均衡中的相关组成部分。
This paper derives the essential elements of tax systems as the outcome of rational behavior in a model w here government maximizes expected support and where opposition to ta xation depends on the loss in full income. The analysis treats the le vel of expenditures as endogenous and integrates the influence of adm inistration costs with that of political and economic factors. Tax st ructure is shown to be a system of related components in equilibrium. A final section compares results to two alternative approaches, opti mal taxation and the Leviathan model. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.