Optimal contracts for central bankers
用委托代理模型研究如何设计中央银行家的激励合同，以实现社会最优政策。结果表明，最优合同将报酬与实际通胀挂钩，能消除通胀偏差并最优应对冲击。
This paper adopts a principal-agent framework to determine how a central banker's incentives should be structured to induce the socially optimal policy. In contrast to previous findings using ad hoc targeting rules, the inflation bias of discretionary policy is eliminated and an optimal response to shocks is achieved by the optimal incentive contract, even in the presence of private central-bank information. In the one-period model that has formed the basis for much of the literature on discretionary monetary policy, it is shown that the optimal contract ties the rewards of the central banker to realized inflation. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.