An Essay on the Foundations of Friedman's Methodology
检验弗里德曼声称其方法论与波普尔科学观一致的说法，通过分析其学术背景和著作，发现弗里德曼与波普尔在拒斥实证主义上有共同点，但弗里德曼的实证经济学方法论主要依赖波普尔的部分哲学观点，而非全部。
Milton Friedman's famous essay on methodology (1953, pp. 3-43) has been presented as an instrumentalist argument for instrumentalism (Boland, 1979). Although Friedman has stated that such characterization of his methodology is entirely he also says (1979) that his views on methods and the philosophy of can be aligned with those of the philosopher Karl Popper. Many students of the philosophy of science would be possibly shocked by such a claim, since Popper has so often criticized and rejected both instrumentalism and Logical Positivism (1965). Thus, against such background, we present our examination of Friedman's claim. Evidence which we gathered to determine the extent of the relationship between Friedman's methodology and Popper's view of science will be presented. It will be argued that to a degree Friedman's claim can be supported. The major point is that Friedman identifies with Popper for two reasons: 1) Both Friedman and Popper reject Positivism; 2) Friedman and his followers tend to argue indirectly in advancing a view by criticizing its alternatives. Presumably, we either accept Positivism (for example, Paul Samuelson, Carl Hemple, Rudolph Carnap, among others), or we do not. Obviously, this line of argument considers only two among a possibly larger number of options (a confrontation of competing views, as were, as found in Friedman's view of hypothesis testing). A minor point is that Friedman does not see Popper dismissing instrumentalism completely. In this he is correct, since Popper only criticizes instrumentalism as a philosophy of science, while accepting as a methodology for social policy. Except for a brief statement that Factual evidence can never 'prove' a hypothesis, can only disprove it (1953, p. 9), nothing in Friedman's essay seems to depend on Popper's philosophy of science. So, if there is an alignment of Friedman's view with Popper's, will have to be found separately from the famous essay. Thus, we examine the prospect with reference to his academic and research backgrounds (including examples from his work), and to his association with Popper. A corollary purpose of our essay is to indicate how Friedman's view of the methodology of positive economics depends on his acceptance of some (but perhaps not all) of Popper's philosophical discussions of the nature and purpose of science. As we indicate, Friedman's early orientation in methods had no immediate background in established economics. That the main and crucial elements of Friedman's work came from outside may be gleaned from a review of these elements and their antecedents. This emphasis reveals the following: 1) that Friedman has been incorrectly identified with Logical Positivism (Warren Gramm, pp. 169, 171, 175; Samuelson, 1963, pp. 82-83), a doctrine about the unity of science as formulated in Vienna in the 1920's; and 2) that Friedman is much less aligned than commonly presumed with the views of his Chicago mentors. In Friedman's economics, theories are partly arguments for alternative policies (and/or social reform). An interdependent system of analytic constructions (rather than isolated construction in economics) is used to generate hypotheses and for predicting the effects of alternative policies. Contrary to the conventional views of statistical induction and logical deductions from known true assumptions, as dealt with elsewhere (Boland, 1979, pp. 512-13; 1981), the purpose of economic theory for Friedman is prediction for purposes of testing and evaluating alternative policies. These policies over Friedman's career *The University of Florida and Simon Fraser University, respectively. We thank John Chant. Stephen Easton, Herbert Grubel, Zane Spindler. and James F. O'Conner for comments on an early draft. Milton Friedman was cooperative in answering questions we raised. We alone are responsible for the final product.