Stayers as "Workers" and "Savers": Toward Reconciling the Pension-Quit Literature
提出，延期工资合同吸引的是储蓄者，而储蓄者通常也是更好的工作者，企业更愿意留住他们并支付更高工资，从而解释了为何延期工资、高薪酬和低离职倾向会同时出现。
The classic selection effect posits that deferred wages attract stayers. The results in this paper suggest an alternative explanation. Deferred wage contracts attract savers. All else constant, savers are better workers than nonsavers. A firm naturally works harder to retain better workers, and thus, is led to pay them higher wages; thereby encouraging savers to remain in the firm's employ. This process creates a confluence of deferred wages, high levels of compensation and low quit propensities. In this explanation, staying is merely the result of a selection process, and not the underlying factor that drives selection.