Family Policy with Non-Cooperative Families
研究非合作家庭中市场工作与家庭公共品（如育儿、养老）的时间分配，发现公共品供给不足，但公共提供可能因挤出效应而不必要；夫妻间的再分配政策可能改善帕累托效率，累进所得税也能提升福利。
We consider a non-cooperative model of a family's time allocation between market work and providing a home-produced family public good (such as child care or care for the elderly). The model predicts underprovision of the public good. Because of crowding out, this does not necessarily warrant public provision. In contrast to other approaches in family economics, we find that attempts to redistribute between spouses may alter the final distribution within the marriage, and that such a policy may be Pareto improving. We also find that some degree of progressivity of the income tax can be welfare improving.