A Note on Cost Sharing of Municipal Wastewater Pollution Abatement Projectst
探讨了在联邦资金受限时，如何优化市政废水污染治理的成本分摊规则，指出此时无法使用简单的按边际收益比例分摊的关联规则，而需同时确定各社区的最优治理水平和分摊比例。
were equal, at the margin, to the ratio of local to social benefits at the margin. (Social refers to the sum of local and non-local factors.) This cost-sharing rule, in which costs are shared in proportion to benefits at the margin, was called the Association Rule by Marshall. Application of the Association Rule to optimize resource allocation for pollution control is critically dependent upon the satisfaction of several assumptions not made explicit by Marshall. One of the most important implicit assumptions is that sufficient funding is available to pay for the federal government's share of costs at the socially optimal abatement levels. The model developed in the following sections allows for relaxation of this assumption. Two main conclusions emerge when federal cost-sharing funds are constrained. First, there are no simple (i.e., independent) cost-sharing rules similar to the Association Rule that can be employed to allocate available grantor funds among communities in a manner that will maximize the difference between social abatement benefits and costs, subject to the cost-sharing constraint. The constrained optimal levels of abatement and the appropriate costsharing proportions have to be determined simultaneously for all relevant communities.