Regulator Selection Methods and Electricity Prices
研究了监管者选举方式（民选或任命）对电价水平和结构的影响，发现民选监管者并未带来更低的电价，但电价相对变动方向与预期一致。
Proponents of regulator change argue that elected utility commissions would perform better than appointed commissions, but an unresolved issue is whether the method of regulator selection influences rate levels and rate structures. This analysis presumes that regulators are more than mediators between producers and consumers, i.e., that they act in their self-interest to maximize their preference functions. The authors hypothesize that directly elected regulators (reflecting relatively higher voter input to regulatory decisionmaking) permit lower electricity prices, and that elected regulators will reflect strong opposition to rate increases. Economic analysis of the relevance of regulatory arrangement finds that this hypothesis is not valid, although the direction in the movement of relative rates through time is consistent with their expectations. 23 references, 7 tables.