Executive preferences for governance modes and exchange partners: An information economics perspective
研究高管如何通过治理决策和伙伴选择来应对国际合资与收购中的信息不对称和逆向选择问题，对关注企业跨国合作的高管和学者有参考价值。
This study investigates how executives address information asymmetry and adverse selection surrounding international joint ventures ( IJVs ) and acquisitions. We argue that executives can address such exchange hazards not only through their governance decisions, as prior research indicates, but also through their selection of exchange partners. Our experimental design complements prior research on firms' governance choices in three ways: (1) by incorporating multiple potential exchange partners rather than taking a single partner as given for a realized transaction; (2) by accommodating multiple potential entry modes to address interdependencies across governance structures; and (3) by providing direct evidence on executives' assessments of IJVs and acquisitions. We join together organizational governance research and decision‐making research on IJV partner selection, two literatures that have largely developed separately. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.