On Endogenously Staggered Prices
泰勒的交错合同模型是名义刚性的重要解释，但标准不完全竞争模型中企业会同步调价。本文构建了一个能产生稳定交错定价的简单不完全竞争模型，依赖行业内和行业间的策略互动，并得到连续统的稳定交错价格均衡。
Taylor's model of staggered contracts is an in uential explanation for nominal inertia and the persistent real e ects of nominal shocks. However, in standard imperfect competition models, if agents are allowed to choose the timing of pricing decisions, they will typically choose to synchronize. This paper provides a simple model of imperfect competition which produces stable staggering. Our argument relies on strategic interaction at two levels | between rms within an industries, and across industries | and produces a continuum of stable staggered price equilibria.