The Macroeconomics of Dr. Strangelove
在一个嵌入代际交叠模型的威慑/冲突博弈中，分析两个敌对国家的武器积累决策，研究代际外部性和国际合作的帕累托改进可能性。
This paper examines the weapons-accumulation decisions of two adversarial countries in the context of a deterrence/conflict initiation game embedded in an overlapping-generations model. The demographic structure permits analysis of both within- and between-country intergenerational externalities caused by past weapons-accumulation decisions, as well as of intragenerational externalities from the adversary's current weap ons accumulation. Zero accumulation is a possible equilibrium with both noncooperative and cooperative behavior. Countries may also accumula te weapons to the point where conflict initiation never occurs. Pareto-improving policies are generally available but international cooperation need not be Pareto-improving. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.