Sustaining Cooperation in Trust Games
借鉴囚徒困境中群体聚类促进合作的思想，将其应用于两人信任博弈。通过根据玩家近期记录对其分类并配对，研究在更合作的环境中人们是否更倾向于合作，并与随机配对对照组比较。
It is well-known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in Prisoner’s Dilemma games allows some cooperative strategies to invade popula-tions of stable defecting strategies. We adapt this idea of population clustering to a two-person trust game. Without knowing it, players are typed based on their recent track record as to whether or not they are trusting (Players 1) and whether or not they are trustworthy (Players 2). They are then paired according to those types: trustors with trustworthy types, and similarly non-trustors with untrustworthy types. In the control comparisons, Players 1 are randomly repaired with Players 2 without regard to type. We ask: are there natural tendencies for people to cooperate more frequently in environments in which they experience more cooperation in comparison with controls?