Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents
研究了一类多委托人和至少三个代理人的机制博弈，发现类似民间定理的结果：纯策略序贯均衡实现某个配置当且仅当该配置激励相容且每个委托人的期望效用不低于其阈值。
We consider a class of mechanism games in which there are multiple principals and three or more agents. For a mechanism game in this class, a sort of folk theorem holds: there is a threshold value for each of the principals such that an allocation is achieved at a pure-strategy sequential equilibrium of the game if and only if (i) it is incentive compatible and (ii) it attains an expected utility for each principal that is greater than or equal to the threshold value for the principal. Copyright 2010 The Econometric Society.