An Efficient Nonmarket Institution under Imperfect Markets: Labor Sharing for Tropical Forest Clearing
研究了亚马逊刀耕火种农民在森林清理中家庭、雇佣和合作劳动的替代性、生产率和效率，发现劳动共享与市场结合能实现高效劳动配置，且信贷政策影响劳动组成和网络形成。
Abstract This article examines the substitutability, productivity, efficiency, and evolution of an important agrarian nonmarket institution—labor sharing. Analysis of field‐level data on forest clearing through time among Amazonian shifting cultivators reveals that ( a ) family, hired, and cooperative labor are perfect substitutes, and hired and cooperative labor are equally productive, and both are more productive than family labor; ( b ) the combination of labor market and labor sharing makes productivity‐adjusted total labor use unconstrained by household and network endowments (i.e., efficient labor allocation); and ( c ) as labor composition is constrained by network endowments and liquidity, credit policies alter both labor composition and labor network formation.