Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth
利用分娩微观数据，比较医生患者与非医生患者的剖腹产率差异，发现医生患者剖腹产率低约10%，且不受财务激励影响，健康结果更好。
This paper provides new evidence on the interaction between patient information and physician financial incentives. Using rich microdata on childbirth, we compare the treatment of physicians when they are patients with that of comparable nonphysicians. We also exploit the presence of HMO-owned hospitals to determine how the treatment gap varies with providers’ financial incentives. Consistent with induced demand, physicians are approximately 10 percent less likely to receive a C-section, with only a quarter of this effect attributable to differential sorting. While financial incentives affect the treatment of nonphysicians, physician-patients are largely unaffected. Physicians also have better health outcomes.