THE CHOICE OF APPORTIONMENT FACTORS UNDER FORMULA APPORTIONMENT*
研究了公式分配法下分配因子的选择，发现无论由地方还是中央决定，公式都包含流动和固定要素，中央可用其纠正财政外部性，校准欧盟数据表明替代独立核算可大幅增加税收和福利。
This paper investigates the choice of apportionment factors under a corporate tax system of Formula Apportionment. In contrast to perceived wisdom, we show that the apportionment formula contains both mobile (capital) and immobile (labor) factors, regardless of whether the formula is determined decentrally by jurisdictions or centrally by a central planner. The central planner uses the formula as a corrective instrument to internalize fiscal externalities. We calibrate the model to the European Union and show that replacing the current system of Separate Accounting by Formula Apportionment would substantially increase tax revenue and welfare under both centralized and decentralized formula choices.