Attacked from Both Sides: A Dynamic Model of Multinational Corporations' Strategies for Protection of Their Property Rights
研究了跨国公司在面临东道国政府与商业伙伴双重机会主义时，如何通过政治整合策略保护财产权，并指出该策略在制度变化后可能适得其反。
Multinationals operating in site‐specific industries face two types of opportunistic behavior. If they vertically integrate, host governments have incentives to change existing legislation challenging the firms' property rights. If they do not, they can be held up by business partners or lose control over the production process. These conflicting problems are reflected in the contradictory assessment made by the obsolescing bargaining power and transaction costs economics theories. Drawing on property rights theory, we introduce political integration as a strategy to address the two conflicting problems. It involves the integration of the host country's polities within the multinational's structure to avoid government opportunism, while still benefiting from the advantages of vertical integration. However, this strategy can backfire after institutional changes in the host country.