Exclusive Contracts and Market Dominance
提出排他性交易的新理论，假设支配企业具有竞争优势且买家支付意愿为私人信息，支配企业可强制买家接受排他条款而不必补偿，从而既获利又限制竞争，对竞争政策和反垄断案例有启示。
We propose a new theory of exclusive dealing. The theory is based on the assumption that a dominant firm has a competitive advantage over its rivals, and that the buyers' willingness to pay for the product is private information. In this setting, the dominant firm can impose contractual restrictions on buyers without necessarily compensating them, implying that exclusive dealing contracts can be both profitable and anticompetitive. We discuss the general implications of the theory for competition policy and illustrate by examples its applicability to antitrust cases.