The Case of Monopoly and Pollution
评论了Endres关于垄断作为污染控制手段效率低下的观点，指出垄断者无意中复制完全成本内部化竞争均衡的可能性很小，并质疑Buchanan关于垄断污染可能减少竞争和环境政策需求的论断。
IN a recent note, Endres [3] shows that monopoly is an inefficient means of pollution control in precisely the same sense in which, with a competitive model, are Pigovian t-axes on output. The existence of feasible control for some polluting activity considerably alters the sense of Buchanan's [1] original essay. In particular, we can no longer claim that a monopolist may accidentally duplicate the equilibrium achieved under full cost internalisation by profit maximising competitive firms. If full cost internalisation implies that competitive firms will adopt a pollution control technology, rather than pay a charge for environmental inputs, the resulting product price/output configuration for the industry might be accidentally achieved by the use of monopoly power. However, the monopolist would have no incentive to adopt control so that this does not carry the implication of a socially optimal use of inputs in the industry.' Endres' note succeeds in reducing Buchanan's argument to the status it deserves, which is that of curiosum, perhaps found when production processes are effectively fixed. In general, the strongest claim which can be made for monopoly pollution is that it may be preferable to unregulated competition under particular combinations of output restraint and external cost. However, Buchanan's essay suggests that somehow both the need for competition and environmental policy is diminished. As the Buchanan curiosum is unlikely to occur, a relevant question to ask concerns the nature of policy geared to controlling the monopoly polluter.