Group polarization on corporate boards: Theory and evidence on board decisions about acquisition premiums
研究群体极化这一基本决策偏差如何影响董事会对收购溢价的决策，发现讨论后董事支持溢价会向极端偏移，且受董事同质性和少数专家意见影响。
This study investigates how a fundamental group decision‐making bias referred to as group polarization can influence boards' acquisition premium decisions. The theory suggests that when prior premium experience would lead directors on average to support a relatively high premium prior to board discussions, they will support a focal premium that is even higher after discussions; but when directors' prior premium experience would lead them on average to support a relatively low premium prior to board discussions, they will support a focal premium that is even lower after discussions. Results provided strong support for the theory. Moreover, group polarization was reduced by demographic homogeneity among directors and by minority expertise but increased by board influence. This study introduces a fundamental group decision‐making bias into governance research and explains how group processes can influence network diffusions . Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.