MERGERS WITH BUNDLING IN COMPLEMENTARY MARKETS*
构建模型分析互补系统市场中并购后捆绑行为对定价、福利、创新激励及技术捆绑/兼容决策的影响，并探讨反并购及禁止捆绑作为并购条件的政策含义。
This paper develops a simple model to analyze the effects of mergers in complementary system markets when the merged firm is able to engage in bundling. In particular, I analyze the impact of (mixed) bundling on pricing decisions for existing generations of products and derive welfare implications of mergers. The basic model is then extended to analyze industry dynamics where the implications of mergers for innovation incentives and technical tying/compatibility decisions are explored. I also consider the possibility of counter‐merger and derive implications of the policy prescription that prohibits bundling as a condition for merger.