How Should Monetary Policymakers Respond to the New Challenges of Global Economic Integration
讨论了全球经济一体化对中央银行的四个挑战：区域经济一体化与共同货币、开放经济对通胀的影响、全球金融机构的监管、以及资本流动对货币政策管理的复杂性。
There are, of course, many aspects of global economic integration that have quite direct and immediate implications for way in which central banks go about their work. Four issues in particular stand out. First, economies are becoming increasingly integrated through trade, particularly at a regional level. As our conception of the economytakes on less and less of a national dimension and more and more of a regional dimension-whether it be EU, NAFTA, or ASEAN-it is not surprising that parallel questions arise about whether currency arrangements should move in a similar direction, that is, toward enlarged common currency areas. We have already seen advent of a common currency in much of Western Europe. There has been increasingly widespread discussion about pros and cons of dollarization in Americas. And there has even been some discussion of a common currency for East Asia. In my own country, there appears to be quite strong support within business community for forming a common currency with Australia, and some support also for dollarization. Second, questions have also arisen about whether increasing openness of economies is resulting in world becoming less prone to inflation. Does exposure to global competition help to suppress inflation pressures. And is this one of factors behind so-called new paradigm, in which United States in particular appears able to enjoy noninflationary growth at rates previously thought impossible? Third, we are seeing an accelerating trend toward genuinely global financial institutions, including enormous entities, such as Citicorp, HSBC, Deutsche Bank, and UBS. This is raising some issues, including, for example, whether transmission of monetary policy in national banking systems dominated by foreign-owned banks is somehow different from where banks are predominantly local in ownership, and whether regulatory framework is appropriate to dealing with these global behemoths. Fourth, in today's globalized markets, capital moves in amounts and at speeds that complicate management of monetary policy directed to achieving internal macro objectives. Most now accept that where there are no restrictions on capital flows, it is not possible, at least not beyond quite narrow limits, to simultaneously direct monetary policy to an internal objective (such as an inflation target) and an external objective (such as an exchange rate target). In my few minutes, I will focus mainly on fourth of these issues, as it has been most challenging issue facing us in New Zealand. Having said that, it will also be evident that issues I have listed overlap and interact to some degree. Substantial current account imbalances and associated capital flows have always been a feature of economic landscape, of course. However, with liberalization of private capital flows and increased trading in marketable securities, gross private capital flows during last decade or so have been larger, faster, and perhaps more concerted, than in preceding decades (and probably at any time in history of modern central banking). I don't think there is any need at this point in proceeding to try to support that proposition with data. But let me just quote a few numbers to illustrate point in case of New Zealand. In 1990, government's net foreign-currency debt was equivalent to 22 percent of GDP By 1998, that net foreign-currency debt had fallen to zero. On other hand, during same period, nonresident holdings of New Zealand government New Zealand dollar bonds rose from 14 percent of total on issue to 65 percent of total on issue. During same period, outstanding euro-kiwi issues (issues of New Zealand dollar bonds by foreign corporations and governments) rose from 8 percent of New Zealand's GDP to 18 percent. During same period, foreign ownership of New Zealand equity market rose from 23 percent of market capitalization to 55 percent. …