The Learning Curve, Market Dominance, and Predatory Pricing
分析学习曲线假设在价格设定、差异化双头垄断中的战略含义，刻画马尔可夫完美均衡，说明市场主导地位如何自我强化，并基于学习曲线提出掠夺性定价的新理论。
Strategic implications of the learning curve hypothesis are analyzed in the context of a price-setting, differentiated duopoly selling to a sequence of heterogeneous buyers with uncertain demands. A unique Markov perfect equilibrium is characterized and sufficient conditions are provided for market dominance to be self-reinforcing. Increasing market dominance implies that learning is privately disadvantageous. Finally, introducing avoidable fixed costs and possible exit into the model yields a new theory of predatory pricing based on the learning curve hypothesis. Copyright 1994 by The Econometric Society.